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Summary. — Standards organizations and NGOs have begun to refer to “fair carbon” projects, and “fairly traded” carbon credits.
“Fairness” is a fuzzy notion, subject to multiple and competing interpretations. This paper draws on a framing used by standards orga-
nizations, which encompasses issues of access and beneﬁts, to critically examine challenges and opportunities for achieving desired “fair”
outcomes as discussed in the literature. Arising knowledge gaps are presented as a research agenda that explores what “fair carbon”
means to multiple stakeholders; illuminates governance processes through which “fairness” is being standardized; and examines its impli-
cations within certiﬁed carbon projects.
 2015TheAuthors. Published byElsevierLtd.This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Carbon markets have become one of the main approaches to
mitigating the climate crisis worldwide (Lohmann, 2010). They
allow governments, companies, and individuals to compensate
their own emissions by ﬁnancing emissions reductions in
another area of the world, in both an eﬃcient and politically
attractive way (Boyd, Boykoﬀ, & Newell, 2011). Carbon oﬀ-
sets, which involve the measurement and transaction of emis-
sions savings, have become a new commodity linking north
and south via a complex array of technologies, institutions,
and discourses (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008). They are created
within carbon projects, which involve sets of activities which
supposedly result in less greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
compared to a hypothetical situation without the project
(Lohmann, 2010). However, concerns about dubious environ-
mental eﬀectiveness (Green, 2013) and the equity, justice,
governance, and legitimacy of the mechanisms that carbon
markets entail (McDermott, Mahanty, & Schreckenberg,
2013; Merger & Pistorius, 2011; Page, 2012), render them high-
ly controversial.
In the absence of an eﬀective United Nations coordinated
global agreement, the carbon arena looks set to become more
fragmented and complex (Lo¨vbrand & Stripple, 2012).
Markets are being created at transnational, regional, national,
and sub-national levels, by governments as well as private
actors, and many of them are not linked to the Kyoto Protocol
at all (Newell, Pizer, & Raimi, 2013). Perspectives on the way
forward are equally fragmented. Movements opposing carbon
markets and their attempts to commodify the Earth’s carbon
cycling capacity, and campaigns for a fair transition away
from fossil fuel dependence, co-exist along technical-ﬁx
proposals for governments to expand carbon markets. This
complex interplay of actors combines with calls for Standard
Setting Organizations (SSOs) to oversee better measurement
and calculation and develop new schemes for certiﬁcation
and reform (Lohmann, 2010). Insuﬃcient attention has been
paid to the performance of these schemes, or the normative
ideals they invoke (Page, 2012). As the schemes and the
markets they are part of are socially and politically embedded,
they hold the potential to be socially and politically transfor-
mative. There is need to determine whether SSOs can trigger
alternative outcomes where equity and justice can emerge
(Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012, p. 254), or whether they
are simply laying down ever more implausible sets of rules
and procedures (Lohmann, 2010) that do little to interact with
the global development agenda.
Our aim in this paper is to respond to this need by undertak-
ing a critical analysis of one particular attempt to innovate and
revise a portion of the voluntary carbon market and introduce
the normative ideal of fairness. This is being conducted
through an initiative involving a carbon SSO (Gold Standard)
and a sustainability SSO (Fairtrade International). Their part-
nership has brought the concepts of Fair Trade and Carbon
Trading to the same table for the ﬁrst time, with a commitment
to enhance fairness in the carbon market. Fairness, equity, and
justice are widely interpreted and lack clear deﬁnitions within
carbon projects (Luttrell et al., 2013; McDermott et al.,
2013). This contested ground is also apparent within sustain-
ability product certiﬁcation, where Fairtrade International’s
hegemony of power to deﬁne fairness is internally and external-
ly contested, with competing actors beginning to develop their
own “fair” labels (Renard & Loconto, 2013; Tallontire &
Nelson, 2013). We use the term fairness to encompass justice
and equity concerns in the carbon market, following
Schroeder and McDermott (2014), and the term “fair carbon”
to refer to the normative ideal of incorporating fairness into the
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carbon market, which is what Gold Standard (GS) and Fair-
trade International (FI) are aiming towards. 1 “Fair carbon”
is likely to be met with mixed responses, as for some it repre-
sents a misnomer, while for others, it oﬀers a space for change.
We unravel the concept by exploring the context in which it is
being introduced, the meanings attached to it, and the
challenges implied by commitments to achieving it.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2we deﬁne
the context for our analysis by locating the GS–FI partnership
alongside parallel standard setting initiatives within the volun-
tary market, and explaining the triggers for this particular part-
nership. In Section 3we unravel or operationalize the concept of
“fair carbon” by examining its meanings in three interrelated
areas. This involves: (a) reviewing ethical debates around the
concept of carbon trading; (b) looking at the SSOs’ own initial
interpretations of fairness, which center on questions of access
and beneﬁts; and (c) exploring theoretical understandings of the
relationships between access, beneﬁts, and fairness in the
context of carbon markets and carbon projects. Section 4
displays the methodology for conducting the literature review
presented in Section 5.We identify structural and practical chal-
lenges in the current carbonmarket space whichGold Standard
(GS) and Fairtrade International (FI) would need to address if
they were to fulﬁll their fairness commitments, and map these
alongside their proposed interventions. 2 We also highlight
key lessons from ongoing attempts by carbon project
developers and SSOs to open up access and enhance beneﬁts.
In Section 6, we identify next steps to be addressed through a
critical longitudinal analysis of the GS–FI partnership. These
include embedding it more deeply within contemporary
sustainability governance dynamics, identifying what exactly
fairness means to the various actors involved and which
mechanisms are deemed appropriate for achieving it, and
critically assessing thesemechanisms in the context of particular
smallholder- and community-focused carbon projects. Our
focus is largely on sub-Saharan Africa and bio-carbon projects
(carbon stored above or below ground, in trees, forests, and
soils) targeting smallholders and communities. These foci do
not prevent more generic application of the ﬁndings.
2. STANDARD SETTING ON THE VOLUNTARY
CARBON MARKET
The voluntary carbon market (voluntary market) is the
forum for trade of veriﬁed emissions reductions and operates
in parallel with the compliance market developed under the
framework of the UN-created Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM)). The voluntary market was established by NGOs and
private sector companies in the late 1990s at the same time as
the CDM (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). Veriﬁed emissions
reductions are sold to governments, companies, and indi-
viduals who voluntarily oﬀset their emissions, claim carbon
neutrality, and/or invest in projects in the developing world
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2011; Peters-Stanley & Gonzalez,
2014) without contributing to national reduction targets. The
voluntary market has thus far constituted only a fraction of
the total carbon market, and like the CDM, has been aﬀected
by the global ﬁnancial down-turn and suppressed market
demand (Boyd et al., 2011). However, whereas the CDM was
on the verge of collapse by late 2012 (Moosa et al., 2012), the
voluntary market has remained more resilient (Peters-Stanley
et al., 2012). We focus on this fast-developing private area of
the carbon regime, following an expanding series of studies
(Bulkeley et al., 2012; Green, 2013; Hale & Roger, 2014),
attending to the potential spaces for change and incremental
innovations and revisions which are being carved out by
private rule-setters and carbon project implementers. 3
Since the early 21st century, a growing number of SSOs have
stepped into the voluntary market to address concerns about
lack of transparent governance, rigor, and credibility and
forge new approaches which might address the shortcomings
of the CDM (Lovell, 2010). Through the certiﬁcation they
issue, SSOs can potentially make ethical qualities visible to
the consumer and inﬂuence demand (Taylor, 2005), provide
reputational beneﬁts, and insulate projects from activist-led
naming and shaming campaigns (Green, 2013). SSOs have
been established by diﬀerent types of actors for diﬀerent pur-
poses. For example, the Veriﬁed Carbon Standard (VCS)
was launched in 2006 by private sector actors, with the aim
to reduce the costs and administrative burdens of the CDM
and open up eligibility to new types of emissions-reducing
activities (Kollmuss, Zink, & Polycarp, 2008). GS launched
the same year, and was founded by World Wildlife Fund
based on the conviction than the quality of oﬀsets needed to
be raised in terms of their social and environmental beneﬁts,
which the CDM promised but did not have a strong track
record in delivering. During 2006–12, GS oﬀered certiﬁcation
only for projects related to energy eﬃciency and renewable
energy. It based its standards on CDM methodologies, and
incorporated additional criteria for sustainable development
and stakeholder consultation. VCS and GS are the principal
carbon accounting standards on the VCM (proposing tools
and methodologies for accounting of the carbon or equivalent
emission reductions for diﬀerent project-based activities).
Whereas VCS has consistently certiﬁed the majority of VERs
since its creation, GS oﬀsets have typically sold at premium
prices because they incorporate multiple attributes (such as
ensuring signiﬁcant and lasting contributions to sustainable
development, and providing assurance that investments sup-
port environmental integrity). The GS–FI partnership
announced in December 2012 (Gold Standard Foundation
and Fairtrade International, 2012) marked FI’s entry to the
carbon world as a strategy for supporting small-scale farmers
to beneﬁt from climate ﬁnance. It coincided with GS’s decision
to develop new methodologies and standards for reducing
emissions from land use and forestry. 4 The GS–FI partner-
ship is one of many cases of SSOs combining forces to enhance
the range of their expertise. Together, they aim to provide
robust, versatile, and accessible certiﬁcation systems, using
tools such as dual certiﬁcation, optional add-on modules,
and streamlined documentation. 5 In a market context, SSOs
are compelled to set themselves apart from other competitors
and demonstrate product (oﬀset) quality (Green, 2013, p. 6).
The GS–FI partnership can be understood as a measure to
help meet the demands of customers and suppliers of carbon
oﬀsets and maintain market share (Green, 2013). The prospect
of a GS–FI label that can enhance marketability and
legitimacy of oﬀsets may appeal to project developers, brokers,
retailers, and customers.
Other standards have been developed with the aim of
encouraging, measuring, and communicating environmental
and social beneﬁts. Plan Vivo was initiated in 1994 as a frame-
work for “supporting communities to manage their natural
resources more sustainably, with a view to generating climate,
livelihood and ecosystem beneﬁts” (Plan Vivo, 2014). Plan
Vivo certiﬁcation has been limited to a few small-scale land
based projects, but each requires strong local community
involvement. The Climate, Community, and Biodiversity
(CCB) Standard and the Social Carbon standard are both
‘project design’ or ‘co-beneﬁts’ standards, used to certify the
design and implementation of a carbon project in combination
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with a carbon accounting standard (usually VCS) to generate
carbon credits. Combined VCS–CCB certiﬁcation has become
popular since the two organizations launched their joint certi-
ﬁcation scheme (Peters-Stanley & Gonzalez, 2014).
The growing ﬁeld of standards and associated methodolo-
gies has emerged together with the expansion of carbon pro-
jects into new locations and activity sectors in the global
South. Northern oﬀsets companies and NGOs are pioneering
the projects, and often claim that they are assisting local com-
munities, providing co-beneﬁts, and actively engaging people
in the creation of the reductions (Bumpus & Liverman,
2011). Some project developers have asserted that their con-
duct and project implementation mechanisms are “fair”, and
that their oﬀsets are “fairly traded”. 6 Given the controversy
that surrounds carbon trading, such claims are likely to be
contested in the absence of suﬃcient contextual information.
GS and FI are attempting to mediate such claims through
their partnership. Below we introduce the ethical debates that
GS and FI need to engage with to ensure the societal legitima-
cy of their approach.
3. UNRAVELING FAIR CARBON
(a) Can carbon be fair?
Carbon trading has divided NGO, academic and policy-
making communities. Some acknowledge the key role it must
play in combating climate change; others out-rightly oppose it
(Bachram, 2004; Caney, 2010). Within academic, policy, and
campaigns literature, critics have referred to carbon trade as
dumping (Bachram, 2004; Lohmann, 2005) of carbon in poor
countries, while rich countries “continue in their unequal over-
consumption of the world’s resources” (Bachram, 2004, p. 16).
Carbon colonialism has been coined to refer to actors in rich
countries who entice people in poorer countries into sacriﬁcing
long-term development goals in pursuit of short-term capital
gains associated with creating carbon oﬀsets (Bachram,
2004; Page, 2012). As a result, poorer countries may exhaust
their cheaper mitigation options and need to engage in costlier
strategies to meet their reduction targets should these become
compulsory. Other critics argue that everyone should mini-
mize their own environmental impact (Sandel, 2005), with
the ultimate goal being to catalyze a transition away from fos-
sil fuels (Lohmann, 2010).
The main argument for paying others to reduce emissions
through carbon trading is that it can improve environmental
quality (or minimize environmental harm) at least the eco-
nomic cost and with minimum worsening of existing global
inequities (Page, 2012). When carbon trading was ﬁrst intro-
duced, developing nations were motivated by the prospect of
ﬁnancial and technological transfers from the global North
to the global South (Boyd et al., 2011), which were intended
to be channeled into low carbon development pathways. If
an intervention does eﬀectively reduce emissions to a safe level,
it could be judged as just on one level because everyone is enti-
tled, as a matter of justice, to be protected from anthropogenic
climate change (Caney, 2010). However, arguments of eﬃcien-
cy and environmental eﬀectiveness do not adequately address
the ethical dimensions of carbon trading. It is important to
assess whether those involved in carbon trading schemes con-
sider the distribution of costs and burdens to be fair (Caney,
2010), and whether they perceive the scheme to be politically
legitimate and procedurally just (Page, 2012). Any ethical
appraisal of carbon trading “must be sensitive to the very
diverse forms it can take” (Caney, 2010, p. 198). Such an
appraisal can only be done on a case-by-case basis, exploring
how particular schemes operate, whether they are considered
legitimate, which outcomes they result in and whether the
people involved perceive them to be fair. It is too early to
determine whether the GS–FI partnership and the GS–FI
certiﬁed projects will result in outcomes considered fair, but
our analysis here is a ﬁrst step in a more extensive appraisal
of the standard-setting process, its legitimacy, and its potential
outcomes on the ground.
(b) Pillars of fairness for the standard-setters: access and
beneﬁts
“Fair carbon” has not yet been clearly deﬁned in the GS–FI-
standard setting process. This section nevertheless explores the
aspects of fairness these organizations initially announced that
they would tackle. 7 Firstly, FI and GS claim their collabora-
tion will enable access to the carbon market for “thousands
more smallholders in developing countries” (Gold Standard
Foundation and Fairtrade International, 2012). “Communi-
ties” and “farming communities” are also referred to as intend-
ed target beneﬁciaries from their collaboration (Gold Standard
Foundation, 2014). Several mechanisms are mentioned to
address access issues: streamlined and simpliﬁed processes
and reduced transaction costs (Gold Standard Foundation
and Fairtrade International, 2012); guidelines for application
of methodologies, making them easier and more relevant to
smallholders and community projects; tools and capacity-
building sessions for smallholders, making it easier for them
to participate in carbon markets; and upfront ﬁnance mechan-
isms. Secondly, through their collaboration, GS and FI seek to
ensure beneﬁts to smallholders from the carbon market. This is
framed in terms of ﬁnance for those who are least responsible
for atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, enabling them to
both adapt to and mitigate climate change in a way that is “fair
to both people and planet” (Gold Standard Foundation and
Fairtrade International, 2012, p. 1). One way in which GS sug-
gest beneﬁts could be increased through a future Fairtrade
label for GS credits is through “deﬁned, direct and ﬁnancial
beneﬁts to communities” (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014).
(c) Behind the pillars of access and beneﬁts: what does the
literature say?
Fairness in access roughly maps onto Brown and Corbera’s
(2003) equity of access; while fairness in beneﬁts links to sev-
eral concepts including distributional justice (Mathur,
Aﬁonis, Paavola, Dougill, & Stringer, 2014; McDermott
et al., 2013), beneﬁt-sharing (within REDD+), the fair distri-
bution of beneﬁts (Luttrell et al., 2013), or equity of outcome
(Brown & Corbera, 2003). Below we deal with access and
beneﬁts separately and add a third closely related concept of
procedural fairness, also referred to as equity and legitimacy
in decision-making and institutions (Brown & Corbera, 2003).
According to Brown and Corbera (2003), equity of access to
carbon markets refers to the ways that diﬀerent actors are able
to engage with and participate in the carbon market via car-
bon projects. Equity of access depends on factors including
information, communication, knowledge, and formal and
informal institutions that shape access to resources, and also
determines the ways that diﬀerent stakeholders can participate
in and beneﬁt from projects. Equity of access has also been
associated with McDermott et al.’s (2013) concept of contex-
tual equity (Luttrell et al., 2013) because it involves acknowl-
edging contextual factors such as capacity, power, cultural
values, social capital, and the level of dependence on resources
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(Konow, 2001) used in the project. We refer to this component
as “fair access” in our analysis. Fair distribution and related
concepts refer to the ways that stakeholders can beneﬁt from
project outcomes, based on a distribution of net beneﬁts
(Luttrell et al., 2013). Beneﬁts are often considered monetary
and quantiﬁable, but non-monetary beneﬁts can also be
important motivators (Fisher, 2012) and preconditions for
taking part (Luttrell et al., 2013). Fair distribution is likely
to be contested and contextual as the involvement of multiple
stakeholders means that there will be multiple rationales for
deciding how beneﬁts are shared (Luttrell et al., 2013) and
multiple notions of what a fair distribution would look like
(McDermott et al., 2013). We refer to this component as “fair
beneﬁt-sharing” in our analysis.
Both of these concepts are commonly used alongside proce-
dural fairness, which refers to the ways that stakeholders par-
ticipate in decision making and/or project implementation,
and the rules and procedures themselves (Brown & Corbera,
2003; Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013). Procedural fairness is seen
as a pathway to fair beneﬁt-sharing because for outcomes to
be considered as fair, stakeholders must have taken part in
decision-making and their values considered (Suiseeya &
Caplow, 2013). It also links to fair access because it covers
aspects of recognition, representation, power relations, and
opportunities for participation (Mathur et al., 2014). Achiev-
ing fair procedures is dependent on the implementation of
rules and processes, the presence of representative and inclu-
sive institutions, and the possibility to include, or negotiate
between, competing views in a context where diﬀerent stake-
holders have diﬀerent levels of knowledge, power, informa-
tion, and languages at their disposal (Brown & Corbera,
2003). While some scholars see fair access as a component of
procedural fairness (Mathur et al., 2014; Schlosberg, 2004),
we recognize that it interacts with both procedural fairness
and fair beneﬁt-sharing and consider it as separate but inter-
linked. Given the centrality of fair access and fair beneﬁt-
sharing in the GS–FI dialog, we focus on these two concepts.
We nevertheless recognize the importance of fair procedures
within the contexts projects are implemented, and within the
rules and procedures of the standards to which they conform.
4. REVIEW METHODOLOGY
Our overall goal for the literature review was to understand
the practical constraints, structural and contextual factors
associated with fair access, and beneﬁt-sharing for smallhold-
ers and communities, focusing on bio-carbon projects, in
particular in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). We focused on
bio-carbon projects because their mitigation eﬀectiveness is
questionable (Newell et al., 2013), beneﬁts to participants
are less evident (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008) compared to
energy eﬃciency projects, for example involving distribution
of improved cook-stoves (Simon, Bumpus, & Mann, 2012),
and relatively few projects have been developed, 8 so under-
standing of their implications is largely unknown. We selected
SSA because the region has fewer carbon projects being imple-
mented, 9 suggesting that the biggest constraints are present
there. We proceeded to identify relevant literature (project-
speciﬁc case studies, multi-project reviews, general discussions
about carbon projects in the target category, literature on
speciﬁc carbon standards, and their application) by using
search engines, reference lists of key articles, and articles citing
them (see Table 1 for search terms used). We prioritized peer-
reviewed literature but found limited studies of smallhold-
er/community-focused bio-carbon projects being implement-
ed, partly because there are still few projects to date and
most are at early stages of implementation (see Table 2 for
details on the eleven diﬀerent carbon projects detailed in the
case studies we identiﬁed-notably all but one are forest-carbon
projects, but some also include agricultural land management
within their activities). Many project studies conducted have
been commissioned by project developers or donors and thus
constitute gray literature, which we used only for background
information rather than evidence. However, some of the peer-
reviewed literature used gray literature as an evidence base
(especially project documentation). We compensated for the
paucity of project-speciﬁc literature by reviewing more general
discussions on the challenges in implementing bio-carbon pro-
jects with smallholders and communities in SSA. We analyzed
identiﬁed literature to locate key limitations to access and ben-
eﬁts, on the basis of the themes underlined in Table 1. We also
analyzed the literature on speciﬁc carbon standards and their
application using the Standards themes outlined in Table 1
as a basis. We found that Plan Vivo certiﬁed projects had been
most extensively documented whereas the literature on other
standards and project outcomes was limited to desk reviews
(Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013; Wood, 2011).
5. LIMITS TO FAIR ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING
(a) Fair access
In this section we use evidence from our literature search to
gain a better understanding of some of the principal factors
limiting the ability of smallholders and communities in Africa
to engage with and participate in the carbon market via car-
bon projects. This concerns two overarching areas related to
access to the land and legal resources for taking part in a car-
bon project; and the project development and implementation
process.
(i) Access to resources: land tenure and carbon rights
Weak or insecure land tenure and property rights have been
outlined as major barriers aﬀecting the ability of smallholders,
communities, and particular segments of communities, to
adopt carbon-friendly land management practices (Perez,
Roncoli, Neely, & Steiner, 2007) and participate in carbon
projects (Dougill et al., 2012; Jindal, Swallow, & Kerr,
2008). Indeed, secure property rights (either private or state-
owned) are a major factor aﬀecting the approval of aﬀoresta-
tion/ reforestation projects under the CDM (Thomas,
Dargusch, Harrison, & Herbohn, 2010). This is important
because CDM rules have often been mirrored by standards
used by projects on the voluntary market (Green, 2013).
Tenure security matters when registering and implementing
forest carbon projects because of the need to guarantee the
long-term presence of the trees as carbon sinks. Standards
and methodologies commonly use 25- or 30-year carbon
accounting periods for aﬀorestation/reforestation projects,
and must be able to ensure the permanence of the carbon stock
for at least this period. Project owners are required to demar-
cate the project area, and demonstrate ownership or control,
or at least possess rights to the carbon stock within it
(Leach & Scoones, 2013). Legal land titles are the principal
means for demonstrating ownership or control. Contracts
are used to document the transfer of ownership of the land,
the trees on the land, and/or the rights to the carbon seques-
tered. However, these do not necessarily correspond with the
realities of land tenure. In Africa the disconnect between statu-
tory and customary land rights, plurality and co-existence of
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overlapping land tenure systems, the ﬂuidity and dynamism
which often characterizes customary tenure, and links between
tree tenure and land claim, call into question the overall
feasibility of conducting forest carbon projects (Unruh, 2008).
Projects are liable to intensify competing claims and ignite
land-related conﬂicts because they may entail changes in social
relations with regard to land (Roncoli et al., 2007; Unruh, 2008).
Carbon rights are also not neatly or easily translatable in
contexts where projects are implemented. The term may refer
to the title of the carbon credits generated in a project, or to
Table 2. Details of carbon project reviews and case studies identiﬁed in the literature
Type of literature No. of key articles Project details (and number of studies covering the project)
Single-project case studies 6 Kenyan Agricultural Carbon Project (soil carbon), VCS certiﬁed (2)
Uganda Trees for Global Beneﬁts (community-based forestry),
Plan Vivo certiﬁed (1)
Mozambique Sofala Community Carbon Project (a.k.a. N’hambita),
(community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certiﬁed (2)
Mali: Carbon From Communities (community-based natural resource management),
not certiﬁed (1)
Multi-project comparative case studies 5 Kenyan Agricultural Carbon Project (1)
Mozambique Sofala Community Carbon Project (3)
Uganda Trees for Global Beneﬁts (2)
Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation Project, CDM certiﬁed (1)
Uganda Kikonda Forest Reserve, certiﬁed by Carbon Fix
(now owned by Gold Standard) (protected area) (1)
Malawi Trees for Hope (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certiﬁed (1)
Ghana Vision 2050 (forest plantation), considering CDM certiﬁcation (1)
Sierra Leone Western Area Peninsula Forest Reserve (protected area),
applying for VCS certiﬁcation (1)
DRC Kamoa (environmental conservation), going for Plan Vivo certiﬁcation (1)
Tanzania Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (REDD), no details of certiﬁcation (1)
Africa-wide reviews
of bio-carbon projects
2 1 study covered 42 projects, the other covered 23 projects (including some overlaps)
Table 1. Search terms and criteria
Details of search terms and themes used to identify and analyze the literature
Key words used for initial literature search:
“Carbon projects”, crossed with themes such as equity; fairness; value chains; institutions; trade-oﬀs; knowledge, expertise, and roles for local
communities; and costs and beneﬁts
Access themes explored:
 Challenges and opportunities for implementing bio-carbon projects with smallholders and communities in SSA
 Pros, cons, and risks associated with including smallholders and communities within carbon markets
 Types of bio-carbon project designs amenable to registration
 Requirements for registering and implementing a project involving smallholders and communities
 Resources required for taking part in bio-carbon projects
 Role of institutions in shaping access to these resources
Beneﬁts themes explored:
 Costs and beneﬁts associated with the carbon project
 Monetary and non-monetary beneﬁts and their links with participation
 How costs and beneﬁts are distributed between project stakeholders
 Opportunities for smallholders and community members to take part in project design or implementation
Standard themes explored:
 Rules, procedures, and mechanisms codiﬁed by standards
 Impact of codiﬁcation on project implementation and outcomes
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the rights to beneﬁt from their sales (Karsenty, Vogel, &
Castell, 2014). Few countries have developed legal deﬁnitions
(for example Australia and Argentina). Where there is no
overarching legislation, carbon rights are diﬃcult to compre-
hend, or distinguish from other resource rights (Karsenty
et al., 2014; Lyster, 2011; Tienhaara, 2012) such as rights to
forest or land or particular parts of trees, and are mostly left
to the language of contracts where they are open to interpre-
tation (Passero, 2008). The ambiguity of the notion, and lack
of legislative framework, may mean that project participants
are unaware of their rights. Even where awareness exists, they
may still lack the information to understand the terms they are
signing up to, negotiate more favorable terms or to claim and
fully utilize their rights (Lohmann, 2006; Lyster, 2011). This
issue also concerns future generations who may inherit tenure
or use rights without the awareness or disposition to commit
to what has already been signed. This is particularly problem-
atic with long-term forest carbon projects that assign carbon
rights over periods extending beyond the lifetime of project
participants and infringing on the liberties of future gen-
erations.
Requirements set by SSOs such as demarcation, assigning of
rights, demonstration of ownership, and establishment of con-
tracts are all likely to be much less cost-eﬀective and straight-
forward to achieve in smallholder and community-focused
projects compared to projects carried out in large contiguous
forest areas with simple and clear tenure and an overarching
control of the carbon stock (Leach & Scoones, 2013; Unruh,
2008). This explains why project implementers may opt for
plantation or fortress conservation models in forest carbon
projects (Leach & Scoones, 2013). However several commer-
cial carbon forestry projects in Africa have crumbled following
pillaging by locals, loss of funding, or both (Reynolds, 2012),
suggesting that they are not necessarily better able to guaran-
tee carbon storage for the required number of years. Also, they
are liable to lead to dispossession of land or user rights
(Fairhead et al., 2012), especially when the forest is created
by consolidating customary land holdings (Unruh, 2008). Spe-
cial measures are needed in order to facilitate the registration
and certiﬁcation of smallholder and community-focused
carbon projects, but the literature suggests there is no one-
size-ﬁts-all approach. Table 3 outlines two approaches for
tackling the issues of land tenure and carbon rights respectively.
We analyze how each approach has been justiﬁed; give examples
of where it has been applied, and raise important issues and
concerns which may limit the applicability of these approaches
in projects involving smallholders and communities.
Proposed interventions and lessons. GS and FI initially
proposed the development of relevant methodologies for small-
holders and communities, and guidelines for applying them, as
part of an assortment of interventions (see Section 3(b)). This
might provide an opportunity to address the limitations to
access on the basis of land tenure and carbon rights outlined
above. Notably, GS has limited experience with certiﬁcation
of land-based projects where land security is central (the major-
ity of GS certiﬁed projects involve cook-stoves or other small
domestic appliances and do not require land tenure security).
Therefore, the following lessons are important to bear in mind
where relevantmethodologies and guidelines are being developed.
Firstly, projects and the standards they apply often ignore
or simplify the complexities, proceeding as if ambiguity did
not exist (Gupta, Lo¨vbrand, Turnhout, & Vijge, 2012; Leach
& Scoones, 2013). Attempts to formalize land tenure and clar-
ify legal deﬁnitions of carbon rights, either as a prerequisite
for, or an outcome of carbon standards and projects, may
have negative impacts at the local level, even when they
Table 3. Approaches for tackling tenure and carbon rights issues
Approach Rationale Examples Concerns or issues
Formalizing or
strengthening of tenure
Deemed necessary for contracts to work
and carbon services to be delivered
(Jindal et l., 2008)
Actively encouraged in VCS’s
methodology for mosaic and landscape
scale REDD projects (VCS, 2014)
Formalization of land tenure
often has not worked (Jindal
et al., 2008) and has sometimes
resulted in violence (Unruh,
2008)
Classiﬁed as an indirect beneﬁt of project
implementation (Luttrell et al., 2013)
Plan Vivo projects in Uganda andMalawi
resulted in formalization of tenure on
community land and helped to channel
beneﬁts (Dougill et al., 2012)
Interventions may intensify
completing claims (Roncoli et al.,
2007)
Clear deﬁnitions
for carbon rights
Most countries have not legally deﬁned
carbon rights so projects operate in a
“vacuum of uncertainty” (Luttrell et al.,
2013)
Argentina: carbon rights legally equated
with rights to land, meaning that only
land owners can claim carbon rights
(Karsenty et al., 2014)
Equating carbon rights to land
could jeopardize people’s
attempts to obtain land, because
governments might choose to
assign land to rent-seeking
industries instead or refuse to
transfer property rights to
individuals and communities
(Karsenty et al., 2014)
Could allow for communities or
individuals to beneﬁt from rights to
carbon even if they do not own the land
or trees they have planted on it (Luttrell
et al., 2013)
Deﬁning and allocating carbon
rights may also result in
overriding customary rights to
land (Lyster, 2011)
May need to separate out rights
to carbon from rights to trees or
land (Unruh, 2008)
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intended to facilitate access to projects and the application of
standards. Changes to existing tenure arrangements may not
necessarily be needed (Jindal et al., 2008): it is land security
rather than tenure that matters and this can be achieved
through a variety of means (Perez et al., 2007). It is therefore
crucial to understand diverse tenure realities when standards
are devised and speciﬁc realities in project contexts before they
are designed.
Secondly, SSOs can mediate access to carbon projects for
smallholders and communities through the methodologies
they develop. For example, VCS developed a methodology
for mosaic and landscape-scale REDD projects involving scat-
tered, individual plots managed by various diﬀerent farmers
(VCS, 2014). While such attempts allow greater ﬂexibility,
they may still conﬂict with the livelihood patterns and goals
of mobile people with multiple livelihoods (Leach &
Scoones, 2013). People with grassroots experience including
those who can advocate for local level perspectives, should
be involved in the design of rules, procedures, and methodolo-
gies (Leach & Scoones, 2013). Focus must be placed on the
generation of ﬂexible and creative approaches for ensuring
mitigation eﬀectiveness which enhance rather than prevent
access for smallholders and communities, and allow mitigation
to be carried out in combination with, rather than at the
expense of, local livelihood activities.
(ii) Access to markets: technical complexities, uncertainties, and
costs
Assuming that land tenure and security have been dealt with
appropriately by both SSOs and carbon project implementers,
projects involving smallholders and communities still face
signiﬁcant barriers to implementation and market access.
Challenges relate to technical complexity, uncertainties, and
costs associated with project development, carbon accounting
(monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation of the carbon seques-
tration or emissions reductions created by project activities)
and sales of oﬀsets. Below we explore how these limit access
to markets for smallholders and communities.
Project development and management. Project development
requires multiple steps, starting with an initial assessment of
the project idea, and outlining the carbon mitigation potential,
social and environmental impacts, and the ﬁnancial feasibility
(Leach & Scoones, 2013). This must usually be approved by the
SSO before moving onto a more detailed Project Design Docu-
ment (PDD).The PDD outlines which carbon accounting
methodologies are appropriate. It is often a long, technically-
dense document, has implications on the volume of emissions
reductions that a project will potentially generate, and sets
out the data requirements for verifying project implementation
and actual emissions reductions (Leach & Scoones, 2013). It
forms the backbone for validation (according to the rules
and criteria of the chosen standard), and periodic veriﬁcation
after the project is running, but only has to be written once
per project. Actors involved in multiple projects become adept
at producing PDDs in quite a formulaic way. Sometimes PDDs
are insuﬃciently sensitive to local context or adaptive to chang-
ing local conditions, needs, and priorities. Projects are usually
managed by external (often foreign) project developers who
have skills in identifying potential project activities, deﬁning
and assuring the principles of operation, and searching for buy-
ers (Corbera & Brown, 2010), or who pay consultants to assist
them. It would be diﬃcult for smallholders and communities to
manage and implement projects by themselves. They therefore
rely on project developers and other actors in the carbon oﬀset
value chain, and generally have a weak positioning in relation
to these parties (Mathur et al., 2014).
Carbon accounting. Carbon accounting is characterized by
considerable ambiguity surrounding hypothetical calculations
about emissions trajectories with or without the project
(Lohmann, 2010), and assessments of the actual mitigation
capacity of carbon projects (Jindal, Kerr, & Carter, 2012;
Simon et al., 2012). Various techniques are deployed for esti-
mating and quantifying actual emissions reductions in forest
and soil carbon projects. Calculations and measurements often
involve computer-modeling, satellite imagery, and positioning
systems (Corbera & Brown, 2010) which require upfront
investment and technical capacity building (Perez et al.,
2007), or reliance on external parties. Information gained
using technical methods needs to be contextualized and
ground-truthed with ﬁeld data from permanent ﬁxed plots,
tree surveys (Leach & Scoones, 2013), random sampling,
and/or self-assessments by project participants (Atela, 2012).
Generally, the more robust and complex the methodology
for carbon accounting, the more expensive it is to implement,
with direct implications for the amount of carbon revenue
available to those involved in generating the oﬀset. Field tech-
niques may involve lower upfront investment costs but are
more labor-intensive and time-consuming. However, with less
rigorous methodologies, projects may be required to earmark
a larger proportion of the emissions reductions in a risk-buﬀer
to allow for accounting inaccuracies. In the Kenyan Agricul-
tural Carbon Project, 60% of the carbon oﬀsets generated were
initially set aside (Atela, 2012), leaving little to cover project
implementation and incentives for participants. Certain types
and designs of project face larger challenges in monitoring
of activities and carbon performance.
Soil carbon projects are notoriously costly and complex to
monitor (Sharma & Suppan, 2011), although as more data
become available, results can be extrapolated and costs
decrease. Studies exploring cost-eﬀectiveness of soil carbon
projects often ignore the lower revenue gains resulting from
high discount rates due to economic uncertainty (De Pinto,
Magalhaes, & Ringler, 2010). Also, projects may need to
aggregate large numbers of smallholders and communities
within single schemes in order to generate suﬃcient emissions
reduction volumes to render a project ﬁnancially viable (Perez
et al., 2007; Scherr, Shames, & Friedman, 2012). When par-
ticipants are geographically scattered, monitoring and veriﬁca-
tion become inherently more costly and complex (Leach,
Fairhead, & Fraser, 2012; Perez et al., 2007). While some
authors advocate a role for communities in ﬁeld data collec-
tion, to reduce costs and empower local people, this must be
balanced against the need for robust accounting (Danielsen
et al., 2011; Gupta et al., 2012; Palmer Fry, 2011) and the
money available to remunerate people adequately. Some pro-
jects, such as Trees for Global Beneﬁts in Uganda, rely on vol-
unteers to undertake monitoring (Peskett, Schreckenberg, &
Brown, 2011); this may keep costs down, but relies on people’s
willingness to work without ﬁnancial rewards. Decisions about
which methodologies and techniques should be used to gener-
ate which kinds of data, and who to involve in the collection
and analysis, are politically-laden (Gupta et al., 2012). They
have direct implications for the empowerment or disenfran-
chisement of local communities, as well as directly aﬀecting
the beneﬁts received within the community.
Veriﬁcation, certiﬁcation, and sales of oﬀsets. The structure
of the carbon market necessitates rigorous auditing (veriﬁca-
tion) of a project’s performance and monitoring data, because
the intangibility of carbon oﬀsets means it is possible to inten-
tionally or unintentionally sell or account for them twice (dou-
ble accounting). Also, both supplier and buyer have an interest
in exaggerating the number of carbon oﬀsets that a project has
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produced (Kollmuss et al., 2008). For SSOs to be perceived as
credible, they impose complex (and costly) methods for
accounting both carbon and environmental and social beneﬁts
and granting certiﬁcation. While some SSOs (e.g., Plan Vivo)
reduce costs to the project by using their own staﬀ to conduct
desk audits of projects, SSOs that draw on CDM infrastruc-
ture (e.g., GS) use CDM-accredited auditors or Designated
Operating Entities. These auditors generally command much
higher fees than the auditors from FLOCERT (the designated
Certiﬁcation Body for Fairtrade International) or other sus-
tainability certiﬁcation schemes.
Sales of oﬀsets are usually mediated electronically, via trad-
ing platforms and databases (Corbera & Brown, 2010) and
often involve predominantly Northern brokers, retailers,
and industrial networks. Although some buyers have shown
willingness to pay more for premium oﬀsets which involve
strong storylines and/or rigorous accounting and veriﬁcation
procedures, many buyers are interested in paying as little as
possible (Merger & Pistorius, 2011) or combining a small vol-
ume of premium oﬀsets with a larger volume of cheap oﬀsets
without co-beneﬁts. Overall, carbon oﬀset prices are extreme-
ly volatile and average prices may be insuﬃcient to cover
costs of production for smallholder- and community-focused
bio-carbon oﬀsets, which are comparatively more costly to
generate than credits from cook stove projects, and less pop-
ular on the market (Swallow & Goddard, 2013). Their sales
are mainly limited to voluntary markets because of restric-
tions or non-eligibility on compliance markets (Swallow &
Goddard, 2013). Several bio-carbon projects in SSA have
experienced diﬃculties or delays in making sales (Reynolds,
2012). In the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozam-
bique, it has been suggested that this was partly to do with
the perception of the quality of the Plan Vivo certiﬁcation
(Grace et al., 2010).
Investment costs. It may take several years from the concep-
tion of a project up to the generation and sale of its ﬁrst oﬀ-
sets. The ﬁnance required during this period is likely to be a
signiﬁcant barrier for community or smallholder-led projects,
necessitating a role for investors and donors to put forward
large sums of money with little guarantee of receiving returns
at least in the initial years (Corbera & Brown, 2010). It is par-
ticularly diﬃcult to design ﬁnancially viable projects or source
money to ﬁnance them in a context of price volatility. Many
project ideas are abandoned during the initial feasibility
assessment stage, because of both lack of proﬁtability and
the complexity of developing them (Leach & Scoones, 2013).
Pioneering bio-carbon projects in SSA such as the Sofala
Community Carbon project in Mozambique and the Kenyan
Agricultural Carbon project have been extremely costly to
set up and heavily reliant on donor funding (Swallow &
Goddard, 2013). Costs would have to be reduced if these pro-
jects were extended or implemented elsewhere (Grace et al.,
2010; Jindal et al., 2012).
Proposed interventions and lessons. GS and FI proposed four
interventions (see Section 3(b)) which could potentially
alleviate some of the limitations related to access to markets.
Firstly, streamlined and simpliﬁed processes would make it
easier to tackle project development, carbon accounting, and
other certiﬁcation requirements, potentially opening up these
tasks to a broader range of actors. Secondly, tools and train-
ing to build capacity for smallholders and communities could
facilitate them to take on particular roles within a carbon pro-
ject. However, GS has thus far chosen to go down the route of
rigor, using existing CDM rules and adding further require-
ments. FI standards are already considered diﬃcult for small
producer organizations to apply. Simplicity and streamlining
are greater challenges now that GS and FI are in partnership,
as the combination of approaches could potentially make their
certiﬁcation system more complicated. If quality continues to
be a key consideration, there will continue to be inherent
trade-oﬀs between rigor and simpliﬁcation.
Thirdly, GS and FI’s commitment to reduce transaction
costs could partially resolve the issue of high costs in project
development and generation of oﬀsets. SSOs are responsible
for setting the fees for project registration and certiﬁcation
and deﬁning which actors audit projects against their stan-
dards and these fees absorb signiﬁcant proportions of project
budgets. In general, SSOs have been criticized for the high
costs of certiﬁcation that serve to exclude small producer
organizations (Mutersbaugh, 2005). Nevertheless, projects
involving smallholders and communities scattered over large
areas may have structurally higher operational costs which
make them less able to compete with more centralized types
of project design and these are beyond the inﬂuence of SSOs.
Fourthly, upfront ﬁnancing mechanisms could alleviate
another portion of the burden of investment costs, but out-
comes depend on how these are devised and which conditions
are placed on the ﬁnance. For example, if the upfront ﬁnance
is provided by the buyer of the oﬀsets, they will incur greater
risks, and this could fall back on those producing the oﬀsets
in terms of lower prices. This has often happened when
oﬀsets are sold Ex-Ante (purchased before they have been
delivered), but at lower prices. Also, imposing additional
ﬁnancing requirements on the buyer may discourage some
potential buyers.
Notably, GS and FI did not include any interventions in
their initial set of propositions which could facilitate sales of
carbon oﬀsets. In the context of a weak carbon market, a
shortage of demand for GS–FI certiﬁed oﬀsets is probable.
However, there is some conﬁdence that FI could play a role
in transforming the market (e.g., Ciscell, 2010). In the case
of coﬀee, FI has succeeded in increasing proﬁts and command-
ing a price premium (Nelson & Martin, 2014) although most
discussions on the impact of Fairtrade certiﬁcation ignore
the fact that most coﬀee producers fail to sell all their certiﬁed
coﬀee under Fairtrade conditions because of low demand
(Bacon, Me´ndez, & Fox, 2008). Fairtrade certiﬁed products
have traditionally been bought by individual consumers, but
are increasingly incorporated into public and corporate
procurement strategies (Fisher & Corbala´n, 2013). Similarly,
the voluntary carbon market has a predominantly corporate
consumer base (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman, 2009) but
public authorities are increasingly becoming customers
(Peters-Stanley & Gonzalez, 2014). It is diﬃcult to predict
how the market will evolve in the coming years.
(b) Fair beneﬁt-sharing
Bio-carbon projects involving smallholders and communi-
ties have been shown to be subject to transaction costs which
render them costly to implement. Nevertheless, carbon pro-
jects are commonly considered an opportunity for channel-
ing carbon ﬁnance to those least responsible for climate
change. Several authors have questioned the legitimacy and
eﬃcacy of project budgets managed by donors and investors,
underlining the need to decipher how costs and revenue are
split between the stakeholders involved, what proportion of
the budget is absorbed by transaction costs, as well as how
much goes to the communities responsible for carbon
sequestration (Fairhead et al., 2012; Sharma & Suppan,
2011). In this section we explore both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁ-
nancial beneﬁts in terms of how they are discussed and
350 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
decided on, their relative importance, and the limitations to
determining a “fair share”.
Who deﬁnes co-beneﬁts? Carbon projects carried out under
certiﬁcation frameworks which explicitly take account of sus-
tainable development are supposed to deliver environmental
and social co-beneﬁts to the communities involved or aﬀected
by them, as well as emissions reductions that beneﬁt the world
at large and the oﬀ-setter. Co-beneﬁts must be deﬁned at the
project outset and detailed in initial project documents (usual-
ly by the project developer), and may be optimistically stated
(Lohmann, 2006). For example, a project involving Shea tree
reforestation in Northern Mali promises increased Shea butter
production as a beneﬁt to farmers (Shames, Bignoni, Fay,
Ruhweza, & Wallace, 2010) but as Shea trees take 20–30 years
before they fruit, only future generations can hope to beneﬁt in
this way. Local stakeholder consultations mandated by some
standards (e.g., GS and the CCB Standard) are supposed to
enable participants to contribute to deﬁning sustainable devel-
opment beneﬁts and identifying any potential harm. Although
such tools incentivize a more structured inclusion of social
dimensions in a project (Bumpus, 2011), the actual outcomes
are contingent on the enactment of these tools by diﬀerent
actors and the rigor with which the SSO checks for non-com-
pliance and encourages corrective measures. Evidence from a
desk-review of design documents of 56 forest carbon projects
certiﬁed under the CCB Standard (Suiseeya & Caplow,
2013) suggests that in many cases, mechanisms “were notably
devoid of diverse measures of engagement that could
potentially engage a more comprehensive- and possibly more
representative-group of stakeholders” taking part in the con-
sultation process (Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013, p. 973). Where
methods for inclusion were deployed, the choice of methods
and the information provided about them suggested a more
passive role for the community. In large meetings, people
may be hesitant to express themselves (Suiseeya & Caplow,
2013) and simply presenting technical information might be
insuﬃcient for communicating complex concepts related to
forest carbon projects, and ensuring comprehension (Lewis
& Sheppard, 2006). When it came to providing input, only
57% of projects reported any of the responses received from
community members, and 16 projects did not gather any input
from community-based stakeholders (Suiseeya & Caplow,
2013). There were multiple examples of design documents
which were not compliant with aspects of the Standard but
had nevertheless been validated, suggesting that the criteria
were not being rigorously applied or audited (Suiseeya &
Caplow, 2013).
Financial and non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts. In bio-carbon projects,
the people carrying out practices enabling carbon sequestra-
tion or reduced emissions will need to receive direct and/or
indirect ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts (Stringer et al.,
2012) such as incentive payments, improvements to soil fer-
tility, increased agricultural yields, employment, additional
income from timber or non-timber products harvested from
the trees products, access to cheaper fuel, training, and secured
land tenure. However, evidence suggests that ﬁnancial beneﬁts
have often been insuﬃciently attractive, regular or disseminat-
ed enough to motivate or compensate participants, especially
when they incur signiﬁcant investment, risks, and labor costs
(Dougill et al., 2012; Swallow & Goddard, 2013). Particularly
with carbon projects in SSA involving croplands and pasture,
there is very little evidence to determine whether revenues
from carbon sequestration can actually improve rural produc-
ers’ incomes (Perez et al., 2007). The issue of direct payments,
and whether or not they are a key motivation for adoption and
sustained implementation of new land use practices associated
with carbon projects, is much debated (Fisher, 2012). Evidence
from Trees for Global Beneﬁts in Uganda showed that
payments were the main motivation for involvement, par-
ticularly at the household level, although in one area, and
the existence value of trees was a bigger motivation (Fisher,
2012). Similarly, in the Sofala Community Carbon project in
Mozambique, participants relied on payments which served
as a safety net because planting of trees involved high transac-
tion and opportunity costs and losses when they did not
survive (Dougill et al., 2012). In both projects, payments are
front-loaded: for the former, carbon sequestration activities
laid down in a 25-year contract are paid over the ﬁrst 10 years
(Fisher, 2012), and in the latter, payments for 100 years of car-
bon sequestration are concentrated into the ﬁrst 7 years,
meaning that farmers who provide carbon services get the
“best possible terms” (Jindal et al., 2012, p. 2133). However,
front-loading has implications for temporal sustainability of
carbon sequestration activities, particularly after the end of
the front-loaded payment period (Fisher, 2012). In the
Mozambican project, payments temporarily ceased because
of a rupture in the sale of oﬀsets, and participants were unwill-
ing to act without them and faced disappointment as well as
an income gap (Dougill et al., 2012). This also illustrates that
participants’ perceptions of a project and its associated risks
and beneﬁts can condition behavioral change or adoption
and the sustained implementation of new land use practices
(Dougill et al., 2012; Tschakert, 2007). It may be acknowl-
edged that carbon payments alone cannot emancipate people
from poverty, and are only intended as a way to smooth the
transition to a more sustainable and productive set of land
uses which eventually generate value independent of carbon
payments (Jindal et al., 2012). Nevertheless, implementers
may be wrongly assuming that money is not a signiﬁcant
motivation (Fisher, 2012).
Beneﬁt-sharing within the community. Where beneﬁts do
reach local communities, there is evidence of unjust distribu-
tions, as carbon projects are unlikely to address pre-existing
marginalization (Mathur et al., 2014). In the Sofala Commu-
nity Carbon project in Mozambique, employment was deemed
one of the major economic beneﬁts by those who had been
hired by the project (Jindal et al., 2012), but employment is
usually limited to a few people and may only be temporary.
Actors involved in projects aiming to beneﬁt smallholders
and communities face a challenge in designing them in ways
that maximize investment returns for a range of farmers with-
out marginalizing others (Perez et al., 2007). The role of local
organizations and leaders in brokering deals or facilitating the
distribution of beneﬁts shapes project participants’ abilities to
draw an equitable share of the beneﬁts (Dougill et al., 2012;
Lipper, Pingali, & Zurek, 2006; Perez et al., 2007). If commu-
nity-based carbon projects are to achieve their multiple envi-
ronmental, economic, and social goals, the activities they
incorporate must be backed by “strong rural organizations,
legitimate and representative leadership, client-driven exten-
sion, local capacity building, and informed and enabling
policies” (Perez et al., 2007, p. 8). However, it is diﬃcult to
take into account the diversity of forms of social organization,
institutions, and practices when designing projects, or
standards (Leach & Scoones, 2013; Perez et al., 2007).
Harmful eﬀects and project reputation. Some projects entail
negative impacts on local communities but very few tangible
beneﬁts. Large-scale forestry, biodiversity corridor, and bio-
char projects have been criticized as routes for foreign direct
investors to buy tracts of land cheaply from national govern-
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ments for extended periods, and to beneﬁt disproportionately,
while dispossessing local communities and excluding them
from the resources from which they earn their living (Leach
et al., 2012; Tienhaara, 2012). In some instances, these projects
have incited strong critique from aﬀected communities, and
from journalists and NGOs, jeopardizing the project’s
legitimacy and causing it to crumble (Reynolds, 2012). This
suggests that focusing on local goals may not merely be a
strategy for enhancing social beneﬁts. There are also pragmat-
ic reasons for doing so since a project’s sustainability depends
on its meeting of local and global expectations (Reynolds,
2012).
Proposed interventions and lessons. In the initial GS–FI com-
munication, the only possible intervention relating to beneﬁts
was the suggestion of deﬁned and direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts to
communities (see Section 3(b)). From a standards perspective,
ﬁnancial beneﬁts may be easier to measure and track at least in
the short term, compared to less tangible beneﬁts, or beneﬁts
that take longer to materialize. Choosing to focus on
community rather than individual payments has its own set
of implications for fairness, and depends on the presence of
strong local institutions which serve the interests of the
smallholders and community members involved in projects.
Evidence from the literature suggests that ﬁnancial payments
at the household level may be important motivations for
participants in bio-carbon projects but in themselves are not
enough to pull people out of poverty, especially in the context
of weak market prices. This suggests payments need to be
combined with other types of beneﬁt. Therefore, GS and FI
were potentially raising expectations by suggesting the out-
come of deﬁned and direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts, the delivery of
which is beyond their control.
Meanwhile, GS and FI can potentially shape beneﬁts
accrued from using their label(s), in the form of reputation.
Carbon certiﬁcation has not always been successful in enhanc-
ing reputational beneﬁts, especially in the face of critics’
reports of negative social and environmental outcomes (e.g.,
Kill, 2013; Lohmann, 2006). This critique includes a project
certiﬁed by Plan Vivo, an SSO which emphasizes improvement
of livelihoods and restoration of ecosystems. Evidence of lack
of rigor in the enforcement of carbon standards (Suiseeya &
Caplow, 2013) also threatens the credibility of third party cer-
tiﬁed carbon oﬀsets. The GS–FI partnership is potentially an
opportunity for enhancing reputational beneﬁts since both
SSOs take pride in emphasizing the quality and attributes of
their standards. FI has succeeded in unveiling the social
aspects of production (Nelson & Martin, 2014), although cer-
tiﬁcation schemes have been blamed for sometimes capitaliz-
ing on and claiming credit for practices that coﬀee farmers
have adopted for generations (Bacon et al., 2008). This cri-
tique could potentially become applicable to GS–FI certiﬁed
carbon oﬀsets. Carbon projects must involve activities which
are diﬀerent from “business as usual”. If they fail to prove
additionality of emissions reductions, they will lose their cred-
ibility.
6. DEVELOPING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR FAIR
CARBON
The section above has critically reviewed the ongoing issues
and challenges that GS, FI, and other SSOs will the need to
grapple with as they advance along pathways toward fairness.
Some of the interventions and gaps mentioned above may
only be possible to evaluate several years into the future,
but they can be incorporated into a guiding framework for
reﬂecting upon the standard setting process as it unfolds.
Below we outline three overlapping research areas which have
emerged from our initial analysis and warrant further atten-
tion.
(a) Pinpointing multiple deﬁnitions and mechanisms for achiev-
ing “fair carbon”
This paper has used the broad framings of fairness in terms of
access and beneﬁts. However, the term “fair carbon” is still a
new and fuzzy notion and attempts to deﬁne and operationalize
it through the FI–GS partnership are ongoing. McDermott
et al. note with respect to equity, that “without a clear deﬁni-
tion of which aspects. . . are being pursued and how, it is diﬃ-
cult to evaluate the impact of policies and programs. . ., and
impossible to plan for it eﬀectively” (2013, p. 2). Various theo-
retical frameworks and conceptual lenses for exploring fairness
have been applied to carbon projects and certiﬁcation in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America (Brown & Corbera, 2003; Mathur
et al., 2014; McDermott et al., 2013; Pinto & McDermott,
2013). Others have begun by exploring deﬁnitions of fairness
in practice, and used these to build on environmental fairness
theories (Luttrell et al., 2013; Schlosberg, 2004). Our goal is
not to seek a universal or theory-driven deﬁnition of fairness,
but it will be useful to draw on equity frameworks as reference
points for identifying what does or does not form part of
diﬀerent stakeholders’ perceptions of fairness. McDermott
et al.’s (2013) framework in particular is useful for exploring
not only the content of fairness (for example in terms of access,
procedures, and beneﬁts) but also the outer layers of fairness in
terms of the goal (which fairness outcomes are being aimed for),
the target (who should fairness be for) and how the parameters
are set by GS, FI, and associated partners. This latter
dimension includes exploring who does and who does not
participate in the process of deﬁning what “fair carbon” should
mean, and whose understandings of “fair carbon” are taken
into account in the standard. As well as clarifying plural
deﬁnitions it is also important to identify the speciﬁc standards
mechanisms considered as quintessential for achieving
fairness outcomes by actors taking part in the standards
making process. These mechanisms may each be surrounded
by implicit or explicit theories of change, and their arrival into
a ﬁnal standard will be a result of dynamic governance process-
es involving negotiation of interests, power dynamics, and
compromise.
(b) The GS–FI partnership and sustainability governance
The GS–FI partnership can be viewed within a broader con-
text of sustainability governance, which is characterized by the
emergence of market driven, voluntary standards which have
expanded into ever new sectors (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom,
2004; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014). Non-state governance
through voluntary standards and partnerships and multi-
stakeholder initiatives involving SSOs and other private actors
(Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012; Cheyns, 2011) are charac-
terized by varied dynamics, including convergence between the
policies put forward by diﬀerent private regulators (Green,
2013) as well as rival governance and competition between
standards (Ponte & Riisgaard, 2011; Smith & Fischlein,
2010). Several analytical focal points have been underlined
with respect to such initiatives, such as how and why they
emerge (Green, 2013; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014), the issues
they focus on and the way that they deﬁne the boundaries of
these issues (Bulkeley et al., 2012; Loconto & Fouilleux,
2014). The GS–FI partnership can also be explored in terms
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of the roles of the diﬀerent actors involved, the functions they
perform, and the way that accountability is sought, adding to
Bulkeley et al.’s analysis of parallel climate change governance
initiatives. A number of authors have underlined the need to
critically assess the legitimacy of governance initiatives and
the mechanisms they deploy to garner legitimacy (Fuchs,
Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014;
Smith & Fischlein, 2010; Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013). This is
particularly relevant to the GS–FI partnership because of
the controversy surrounding carbon trading and the sensitivity
of combining fairness with carbon.
(c) Research on standards implementation and actual local level
outcomes
The extent to which standards exclude smallholders from
markets or provide them with opportunities to improve welfare
and competitiveness is much debated and there is evidence to
support both positions (Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Jaﬀee,
Henson, & Diaz Rios, 2011). There have been multiple
attempts to facilitate smallholder compliance with sustain-
ability and food quality standards in recent years, particularly
in SSA, but insuﬃcient research into the impacts or cost-eﬀec-
tiveness of such eﬀorts (Jaﬀee et al., 2011) and their transfor-
mative potential (Bolwig, Ponte, Du Toit, Riisgaard, &
Halberg, 2010). Changes in standards provisions and develop-
ment of new tools may fuel change on the ground in projects,
but actual local outcomes are contingent on factors beyond
standards themselves (Bumpus, 2011), and there is consider-
able room for interpretation and opportunism in the way these
standards are implemented. Therefore, it is critical to explore
not only the standards provisions or the project designs on
paper, but also the implementation of standards and projects
in practice. Several studies have explored the impact of FI stan-
dards (Jaﬀee, 2008; Nelson & Martin, 2014), as well as the
impact of particular carbon projects on poverty reduction
(e.g., Jindal et al., 2012). However, studies on the impact of
particular carbon standards and their ability to produce
changes within projects have been limited to desk reviews
(Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013; Wood, 2011). While it will only
be possible to explore the impact of the complete set of stan-
dards provisions and tools developed through FI and GS’s
partnership retrospectively, initial research can explore this
theme on a micro-scale within the context of particular projects
by examining whether any of the individual fairness mechan-
isms they propose are already mirrored in existing projects, if
and how they are working, and by seeking the opinions of
project participants or those who are involved in project imple-
mentation on the ground.
7. CONCLUSION
Heated debates surround the concept of fairness in carbon
projects but the term itself is widely interpreted and lacks a
clear deﬁnition. We took a pragmatic approach by starting
with the pillars of access and beneﬁts that FI and GS pro-
posed to include in their approach to fairness, and reviewing
the academic literature in order to unravel what lies behind
these pillars. We assessed how they are interconnected, and
which practical constraints shape fairness outcomes within
carbon projects. The GS–FI partnership provides an interest-
ing focus because it potentially opens up discursive and mate-
rial spaces, whereby more vulnerable stakeholders currently
excluded from, or marginal in the carbon trading system
could potentially play a more active role and reap more ben-
eﬁts. Our analysis oﬀers potential guidance for those involved
in setting the parameters of fairness in reﬁning their deﬁni-
tions, as well as informing further academic debate on “fair
carbon”.
While the outcomes of eﬀorts to enhance access and beneﬁts
to smallholders and communities are highly uncertain, it is
important to explore steps being taken toward these goals.
With many actors involved, multiple interests at stake, and a
competitive context which may push SSOs to act quickly to ﬁll
gaps in the standards market, independent research can help
to enhance transparency within the process. This paper con-
tributes to a growing body of critical research on standard-set-
ting processes (Bacon, 2010; Cheyns, 2011; Nelson &
Tallontire, 2014; Reinecke, 2010; Tallontire, Opondo, &
Nelson, 2013). Speciﬁcally we contribute through providing
an exploration of multiple understandings of fairness and
examining which of these feature in GS and FI’s operational-
ization of “fair carbon”. We also contribute more generally by
identifying which governance processes shape the content of
eventual standards, rules, and procedures they develop and
ﬁnally by ascertaining what the various mechanisms perceived
to support greater access and beneﬁts for smallholders and
communities, may look like when implemented within par-
ticular carbon projects. Bringing these areas together will cre-
ate a comprehensive research agenda for carbon projects and
carbon standards aiming to deliver fairness.
NOTES
1. This is our term, and may not match with the eventual name that
the Gold Standard and Fairtrade International assign to their
initiative.
2. Note that these are based on an understanding of what Gold Standard
and Fairtrade International were planning to work on, and some of these
gaps and considerations may already have been addressed or changed
during subsequent discussions and on-going work by the two organiza-
tions.
3. Nevertheless we recognize the overlaps between private governance
spheres and the CDM itself.
4. This also involved entering into a partnership with the Forest
Stewardship Council, also announced in 2012.
5. Other examples are the VCS–CCB partnership, work by VCS, CCB,
and the Rainforest Alliance to promote access for smallholders and
communities to carbon markets, the dual certiﬁcation scheme developed
by the Gold Standard with the Forest Stewardship Council developed for
forests being managed for timber and carbon sequestration, and the add-
on standard for measuring women’s empowerment within carbon projects
developed by WOCAN (Women Organising for Change in Agriculture
and Natural resource management).
6. Examples are the Uganda Carbon Bureau who claim they operate
with a fair trade ethos, and the Fair Climate Network.
7. This is based on the initial press release announcing the collaboration
between Fairtrade International and Gold Standard, and material
published on Gold Standard’s website on the lines of partnership with
Fairtrade International.
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8. This was conﬁrmed by the authors through an analysis of all the
projects listed on the registries and websites up to the end of October 2013
for the following standards: Veriﬁed Carbon Standard, Gold Standard,
Carbon Fix, the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standard,
and Plan Vivo. Social Carbon projects were also reviewed where they were
jointly certiﬁed by VCS and Social Carbon. The analysis showed that there
were signiﬁcantly fewer forest and agricultural projects being implemented
in comparison to renewable energy and energy eﬃciency projects.
9. Also evident from the authors’ analysis, mentioned above.
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